Will limits on free expression prevent terrorism? by Schoeman, Albertus
A free media is a key component of democracy given its role in sharing information, yet it is often 
criticised for its coverage of terrorism, which some regard as facilitating the spread of extremist 
ideologies. Similarly, as extremists have taken to social media, debates around trade-offs between 
freedom of expression and security have resurfaced. This report examines the relationships 
between the traditional media, social media and violent extremism to argue that responses limiting 
freedom of expression are ineffective in combatting violent extremism.  
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Since the 18th century the media has been regarded as the ‘fourth estate’ 
in democracies, owing to its core role in keeping citizens informed and 
thus holding the institutions of government accountable to the public. The 
importance of an informed citizenry in democracy means that politics is 
conducted in the public sphere to ensure that the information that voters 
need to make informed decisions is readily available. This can only be 
achieved through upholding freedom of expression, which allows individuals 
to share their opinions and receive information without undue restriction.
With the evolution of the ways in which information can be disseminated, 
from the printing press to television and the Internet, the role of the media 
in shaping public opinion has grown, and has changed the ways in which 
political discussions occur. With the emergence of the Internet and social 
media, the traditional media – which includes television, radio and print 
media – faces a range of daunting challenges in maintaining relevance in 
terms of sharing and framing current events. 
In democratic societies, complex debates have arisen 
around how to balance security imperatives and 
democratic freedoms
In conjunction with technology 
companies, democratic 
governments should work 
towards the development of 
international principles, norms 
and rules to govern the Internet 
and address the misuse of 
Internet technologies. 
Governments should develop 
policy to increase oversight, 
and limit the use of surveillance 
technology to only serious 
security threats. 
Governments and the 
international community 
should develop regulations 
to control the export of 
surveillance tools, similar to 
arms control mechanisms.
Governments should 
encourage media houses 
to adopt good practices to 
responsibly report on 
terrorist incidents, to avoid 
perpetuating fear through 
unfounded speculation and 
sensational reporting.
Governments should build 
resilience in communities to 
counter the impact of 
extremist messaging and 
should shift efforts towards 
addressing the underlying 
drivers of violent extremism.
Recommendations
The emergence of social media has resulted in a significant shift in how the 
public engages with politics and interacts with information. The effects of 
these new platforms have been particularly pronounced in countries where 
strict control of the traditional media was previously used to limit access to 
information. These technologies have become central to social mobilisation 
and near indispensable for social organisation. While these innovations have 
been used for positive social change, including the exercise of democratic 
freedoms, they have also been abused by those with harmful intent, such 
as extremists. 
Depending on the lens through which it is viewed, social media’s potential 
for connecting like-minded people and sharing information and ideas can 
be regarded either as a vital tool for enhancing democratic processes or as 
a threat to security and stability. These innovations, and their subsequent 
abuse by extremists, have created new debates around the governance of the 
Internet in democracies and authoritarian states alike. In democratic societies, 
as efforts to respond effectively to violent extremism have intensified, complex 
debates have arisen around how to balance security imperatives and 
democratic freedoms such as free speech, expression, privacy and pluralism 
that form the foundation of a functioning democracy. 
This report will examine the relationship between the media and violent 
extremism in the context of democracies. The discussion begins by 
establishing the contemporary context, examining the changing nature of 
media consumption with the emergence of the Internet and social media. 
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This is followed by a discussion on the traditional media’s 
historical coverage of violent extremism and terrorism, 
and the debates that have emerged from this coverage. 
The report then examines contemporary challenges 
posed by social media and the Internet, and analyses 
the response of states to the perceived threats posed 
by violent extremists’ use of these technologies and the 
effects of this state response on democratic values. This 
is followed by a discussion on why a free media and 
freedom of expression are vital for democracy, and why 
suppressing these values will fail to prevent, and likely 
exacerbate, the emergence of violent extremism. Finally, 
recommendations are provided on ways to address the 
emerging phenomenon of extremists’ use of Internet 
technologies within a framework of democratic values. 
Use of terminology
Several terms used here are contested, without 
generally accepted definitions. In this report terms are 
used as follows:
Violent extremism indicates ‘a willingness to use or 
support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, 
including those of a political, social or ideological nature 
and may include acts of terrorism’.1 
Terrorism denotes the use or threat of violence for the 
purpose of intimidation or coercion for political, religious 
or ideological ends.2 
Radicalisation is the process through which individuals or 
groups become susceptible to extremist ideologies, and 
may be a precursor to extremist activities and violence.3 
Traditionally, the media is understood as the grouping of 
mass communications encompassing the press, radio 
and television aimed at reaching large audiences.4 In 
this report, traditional media refers to these established 
industries and their coverage and framing of news 
events. This would, for example, include broadcasters 
such as CNN and members of the print media such as 
the New York Times. 
Social media refers to the collection of Internet platforms 
that allow users to interact through creating and sharing 
content.5 Examples include Facebook and Twitter. While 
information produced by the traditional media can be 
accessed through social media platforms, the distinction 
between the two forms of media lies in the means of 
production and the ability to interact with content.  
The changing nature of media 
production and consumption 
The nature of media production and consumption has 
evolved from the days of the printing press to 24-hour 
news channels, and more recently to the emergence 
of the Internet and social media.6 Where mass media 
has traditionally flowed in a single direction – from the 
information producer to the consumer – the Internet and 
social media have significantly changed how content 
is produced and used and the traditional distinction 
between producers and consumers of content is 
disappearing.7 This interactivity on social media allows 
consumers to engage with the traditional media in new 
ways, with political discussions on current affairs taking 
place online in a mass setting, such as in comment 
sections, without geographical limitations. 
This global democratisation of information has immensely 
increased the flow of information and the ability to create 
and share information, providing access to information 
and expression previously denied to many.8 
These technologies have become 
central to social mobilisation and near 
indispensable for social organisation
The effects of this information revolution have been 
particularly pronounced in authoritarian states, where 
governments have sought to act as the gatekeeper of 
information, with social media posing a significant threat 
to their ability to control information and the media.9 This 
was illustrated during the ‘Arab Spring’ in places such as 
Tunisia, where bloggers and activists used social media 
to share news, such as footage of police brutality,10 
and engage in discussions on democratic ideals,11 
which would ordinarily not be possible owing to the 
government’s manipulation of traditional media.12  
The ease of publishing provided by the Internet and 
social media has significantly increased the number 
of participants in the information production and 
interpretation process. This has also posed challenges 
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to established traditional media outlets, which must now compete with 
new actors on social media that do not necessarily conform to established 
standards relating to traditional journalism such journalistic ethics and pay little 
attention to the validity of claims, fact-checking or the quality of journalism. 
This is a consequence of the changing nature of generating advertising 
revenue, with social media incentivising media outlets to chase page views 
– something more easily obtained through sensationalised reporting and 
favouring quantity over quality.13 Consequently, many traditional media outlets 
struggle to adapt to the changing nature of media consumption and have had 
difficulty transferring their offline presence to online platforms. 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
ARGUABLY SERVES TO 
CONFIRM OR EXACERBATE 
EXISTING BIASES
Extremist groups have used social media to reach out 
to supporters to fuel grievances, promote extremist 
ideologies and incite violent action
The expansion of actors in the news industry has also meant that users have 
a greater choice in what they consume, but instead unwittingly or actively 
gravitate to news agencies that align with their political views.14 Rather than 
creating the open global community initially envisioned by social media 
companies such as Facebook, these platforms have been used to seek out 
and connect with like-minded individuals, creating so-called ‘filter bubbles’ 
where users are rarely exposed to views opposing their own. Consequently, 
social media arguably serves to confirm or exacerbate existing biases.15 
This ability to connect with like-minded individuals is a particular concern in 
the context of violent extremism, where extremist groups have used social 
media to reach out to supporters to fuel grievances, promote extremist 
ideologies and incite violent action. The emerging nature of these technologies 
also means that there is little established practice for governing their use. 
Governments have also been slow to implement appropriate regulations on 
these emergent technologies, with the result that commercial entities are 
compelled to govern their networks themselves. 
The traditional media’s coverage of terrorist acts
Prior to the broad adoption of the Internet and social media, traditional media 
agencies were the primary means of communicating to a mass audience. 
Burke argues that the emergence of modern terrorism seen with groups 
such as al-Qaeda is a result of innovations in mass communication that 
provided extremist groups with the means to reach a large audience through 
their terrorism.16 Only through using the spectacle of terror attacks could 
they attract media attention to their cause. For this reason, some regard the 
traditional media as complicit in the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. 
The rise of new means of mass communication provided by 24-hour news 
channels such as CNN and Al Jazeera in the 1980s and 1990s significantly 
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changed the way in which the public engaged with current affairs, and 
coincided with the new era of terrorism ushered in by groups such as al-
Qaeda. With these innovations, terrorists could gain near instantaneous 
publicity globally through their actions.17 
For years prior to the September 11 attacks, extremist leaders such as 
Osama bin Laden sought to exploit the networks of mass communication 
created by these news agencies, attempting to communicate extremist 
messages to mass audiences through video-recorded statements sent to 
news agencies.18 
His statements and lectures generally failed to gain traction among Western 
media outlets and the group failed to achieve its desired impact of attracting 
attention and influencing global politics. This, however, changed with the 
events of September 11, where Bin Laden succeeded in capturing the 
immediate attention of the entire world, allowing him to significantly shape the 
global agenda for years to come. Through the traditional media’s coverage of 
violent acts, these groups have been able to forcibly inject themselves into the 
global collective consciousness.19 
Terrorism is only successful if the terrorist act is widely communicated.20 
Without coverage, the audience for a terrorist act would be confined to those 
impacted by the attack. Media coverage therefore serves as the conduit 
through which terrorists communicate to a broad international audience.21 
TERRORISM IS ONLY 
SUCCESSFUL IF THE 
TERRORIST ACT IS 
WIDELY COMMUNICATED
Through the traditional media’s coverage of violent 
acts, these groups have been able to forcibly inject 
themselves into the global collective consciousness
A terrorist act is committed with the intention of communicating various 
messages to the defined enemies and supporters of the group.22 Extremists 
use terrorism to undermine trust in an ‘enemy’ state’s capabilities, 
demoralise, and create fear and chaos. This same act demonstrates the 
group’s power to its supporters or potential supporters, and brings attention 
to a cause with the hope of gaining public sympathy. As a result, the media 
has been criticised for providing terrorists with a channel to publicise 
extremist-related issues.
Despite concerns that the media’s coverage of terrorism is spreading 
extremist ideology, the intentions and results of communication do not 
always necessarily align.23 As the messages that extremist groups attempt 
to communicate are filtered through the traditional media, they are altered. In 
the context of terrorism, the violence of the act is the focus of the traditional 
media and not the motives. Accordingly, void of political or ideological 
context, the majority of the public see the perpetrator/s of a terrorist 
act as mentally unstable and their actions inexplicable, undermining the 
perpetrators’ ability to convey their ideological message.24 
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Traditional media coverage of terrorism thus does not confer legitimacy on 
the cause of the terrorist and most often undermines claims to legitimacy.25 
Yet while the traditional media’s coverage of terrorism fails to effectively 
communicate the nuances of extremist ideology, other aspects of the 
communication found in a terrorist act can be transmitted.
The objective of spreading fear is primarily achieved once a terrorist act has 
been widely communicated through media coverage. Through this, acts 
of terror can succeed in undermining the public’s perception of the state’s 
capacity to keep them safe, as terror attacks against civilians are part of a 
broader strategy of attrition intended to create the perception that a state 
is unable to perform its function of maintaining security.26 This perception 
is, however, generally false and intentionally crafted through terrorists’ 
manipulation of the traditional media to portray themselves as stronger and 
more capable than they in fact are. 
Groups such as Islamic State, for example, have used the public’s captivation 
with violence and extremism, and the media’s indulgence of this fascination, 
to their advantage by making graphic videos of people killed in elaborate ways 
to attract attention to their cause and instil fear.27 
GROUPS SUCH AS ISLAMIC 
STATE HAVE USED THE 
PUBLIC’S CAPTIVATION WITH 
VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM 
TO THEIR ADVANTAGE
The traditional media plays a prominent role in the 
securitisation of terrorism responses, by shaping 
public opinion in a way that pressures governments 
into knee-jerk and overly aggressive responses
Attracting large amounts of media attention raises the profile of terrorists and 
makes them appear more powerful. This is achieved where the traditional 
media profiles violence and terrorism to increase viewership and ratings for 
commercial gain.28 This can be seen, for example, in the detailed, minute-to-
minute coverage of terrorist and even suspected terrorist incidents despite 
the lack of immediate information. There is round-the-clock speculation as 
to the motives of the perpetrators, with little tangible evidence available, 
alongside speculative debates on when, how and where the next terrorist 
attack is likely to occur. 
As a result of the phenomenon of ‘availability heuristics’ (in which individuals 
base judgements of event frequency on how easily examples come to mind), 
citizens overestimate the likelihood of terrorist incidents and the threat posed 
by extremist groups.29 This is a consequence of both the dramatic nature 
of terrorist attacks and the disproportionate amount of media coverage 
given to these events. This amplifies fear and heightens the apparent power 
of terrorist groups, making their ability to carry out indiscriminate attacks 
appear greater than their true capabilities. 
By providing such extensive coverage to terrorist groups, the traditional 
media effectively allows itself to be used by extremist groups to project 
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power that they very likely do not possess. This has 
led to some arguing that the effects of the widespread 
coverage of terrorism encourages similar acts, as 
terrorism becomes a successful tactic.30
This false projection of power, and the consequent 
fear of it, has occurred to the extent that terrorism is 
now a leading concern for ordinary citizens in various 
democracies, despite comparatively few incidents.31 
Overexposure to terrorism through the media 
exaggerates public perceptions of the threat and the 
state’s inability to address that threat. This has fostered 
an environment of fear in which popular demand for 
government action has led to the shrinking of civil 
liberties as government powers expand, supposedly in 
exchange for more security. 
Sensational reporting inadvertently undermines 
democracy by assisting terrorist actors in spreading 
fear, thus creating an environment in which individuals 
are willing to surrender rights – to their own detriment. 
Extraordinary powers have been granted to government 
and law enforcement agencies. In the US, for example, 
the effects of this climate of fear can be seen in the 
widespread militarisation of police post-9/11, which 
in turn has created new problems in the relationship 
between the government and its people.32 
In this way, the traditional media plays a prominent role 
in the securitisation of terrorism responses, by shaping 
public opinion in a way that pressures governments 
into knee-jerk and overly aggressive responses. This 
public pressure, built on exaggerated perceptions, can 
in turn lead to counterproductive short-term responses, 
as it encourages the use of force and the restriction of 
human rights.33 
At times such responses have exacerbated the 
problem, where governments have employed tactics 
such as racial profiling or torture to respond to the 
threat, undermining the principles of human rights and 
rule of law upon which democracy is based. These 
undemocratic responses are also precisely the type 
of responses that extremists seek to evoke in their 
efforts to undermine the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions. They deliberately try to elicit securitised 
responses to expose the dissonance between supposed 
democratic values and the realities of how governments 
treat individuals, particularly communities that may be 
regarded as the source of extremism.34 
While media coverage of terrorism does not 
spread extremist ideology, it does spread fear, and 
sensationalism fuels the erosion of democratic freedoms. 
Accordingly, more critical and responsible reporting is 
required on the part of the traditional media in its framing 
of terrorist incidents. This should be done with a critical 
understanding of the intent behind a terrorist act, and 
media companies should accordingly guard against 
being manipulated by these groups. This kind of reporting 
should better contextualise terrorist acts as sporadic 
events and abstain from reporting in ways that perpetuate 
fear through unfounded speculation. 
While media coverage of terrorism 
does not spread extremist ideology, 
it does spread fear
Groups such as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization have already released 
guidelines on how to responsibly report on terrorism,35 
but these can only be effective if media organisations 
adopt them. This primarily requires a change in media 
culture to entrench norms on how terrorist incidents 
should be covered. This can be achieved through 
establishing good practices and shared journalistic 
standards on reporting terrorist incidents, and ensuring 
that they are followed, to avoid sensationalising terrorism 
and extremism.36 
Where extremist groups were previously largely limited 
to reaching a mass audience through exploiting 
the traditional media, the changing nature of media 
production has allowed them to take advantage of social 
media to gain greater control of the messages conveyed 
to the public. By bypassing established traditional media 
networks, extremist groups can directly communicate 
with their supporters or sympathisers without the 
traditional media altering the messages that these groups 
are trying to communicate to their supporters. Where 
traditional media previously received most of the criticism 
for the spread of extremist ideology, the focus has now 
turned to social media and the Internet. 
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Social media, the Internet and state responses 
in the era of violent extremism 
Extremist groups use social media and the Internet to better control the 
message that they communicate to their supporters. While the general public 
associates groups such as Islamic State with graphic violence and brutality, 
a significant proportion of its online recruitment campaign has focused on its 
‘governance’ in the ‘state’ and its utopian vision of building a caliphate for all 
Muslims.37 This dissonance is a result of the differing messages it seeks to 
send to its opponents (graphic violence) and to its supporters (justice 
and legitimacy). 
The Internet and social media have become an area of particular concern in 
terms of radicalisation. Those harbouring extremist views are easily able to 
seek out extremist groups or extremist material. Once online, these individuals 
can become targets of social media users affiliated with extremist groups. In 
this online context, individuals are socialised into extremist thinking through 
a process of ‘grooming’ that shapes the thinking of the target, ultimately 
seeking to direct their behaviour.38
MANY EXTREMISTS GO 
ONLINE NOT TO HAVE 
THEIR BELIEFS CHANGED 
BUT RATHER TO HAVE 
THEM REINFORCED
While the Internet can be used to reinforce extremist 
views and promote violent actions, the existence of 
extremist beliefs is not dependent on the Internet
As a result, some have come to see the Internet itself as the cause of 
radicalisation. However, as illustrated in a study conducted by Gill et al., which 
examines the profiles of 223 convicted terrorists from the United Kingdom 
(UK), many of the extremists ‘went online not to have their beliefs changed but 
rather to have them reinforced’.39 This research suggests that the Internet is 
not the source of their ideological convictions, but that it is their pre-existing 
beliefs that lead them to seek out propaganda material online. 
A similar study conducted by the RAND Corporation suggests that while the 
Internet affords more opportunities for radicalisation, it is ‘not a substitute for 
in-person meetings but, rather, complements in-person communication’.40 
The study finds that the radicalisation process is still heavily reliant on 
interactions with others. 
Therefore, while the Internet can be used to reinforce extremist views and 
promote violent actions, the existence of extremist beliefs is not dependent 
on the Internet. Both studies show that significant radicalisation takes place 
offline or exists prior to seeking out extremist material online, meaning that 
policies overly focused on preventing the dissemination of extremist content 
online would have a limited impact in eradicating extremist ideologies as 
these ideologies exist independently of the Internet. Policies to counter violent 
extremism should recognise that the source of radicalisation lies deeper, in 
issues of marginalisation and oppression.41
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Despite this, concerns around extremists using the Internet and social media 
to further their agendas have led to many governments introducing laws to 
restrict free speech and privacy, and expand surveillance powers. However, 
the distinction between legitimate dissent and extremism is also at times 
blurred for the purpose of maintaining control in oppressive regimes. In some 
states, such as Russia and Turkey, restrictions have been implemented under 
the guise of combatting extremist messaging, but with the intent of curbing 
opposition to government.42 For example, Egypt’s 2015 anti-terror law 
expands the definition of terrorism, authorising the state to limit journalists’ 
freedom and preventing the publication of news on terrorism.43 
Further, under the guise of preventing terrorism, the surveillance powers of 
security agencies have been significantly expanded. In democratic states 
the expansion of surveillance powers and their potential abuse have created 
concerns around the effects on democratic values – such as freedom of 
thought and free speech – as the expansion of these surveillance powers 
makes it possible to track an individual’s communications and movement on 
an unprecedented level.44 
As illustrated in the case of Canadian journalist Patrick Lagacé, where police 
officers misused their surveillance powers in an attempt to uncover sources 
who had shared unflattering information about strife in the police force,45 
these powers can be abused to undermine the watchdog function of the 
media. Additionally, as seen in Mexico,46 these types of surveillance tools can 
also be used to spy on opposition parties to manipulate the electoral process. 
UNDER THE GUISE OF 
PREVENTING TERRORISM, 
THE SURVEILLANCE POWERS 
OF SECURITY AGENCIES IN 
SOME COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN 
SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED
These surveillance tools are created in developed 
democracies and exported to oppressive regimes with 
little regard for the way in which they are used
The Mexican government also used surveillance tools bought from a 
foreign arms manufacturer to spy on officials investigating the 2014 high-
profile disappearance of 43 students.47 Such invasions of privacy blatantly 
undermine accountability mechanisms. In many cases these tools are created 
in developed democracies and exported to oppressive regimes with little 
regard for the way in which they are used or to whom they are sold. This lack 
of oversight has allowed oppressive governments to suppress opposition48 
and undermine democratic institutions.49 
If developed democratic states wish to preserve democratic values 
in emerging democracies and the global community, control must be 
established over the export of surveillance tools to prevent them from being 
used to suppress democracy, just as arms manufacturers are prevented from 
exporting weapons to rights-violating regimes.  
As surveillance technologies and powers are frequently acquired and used 
in secret, it is difficult for the public to ensure oversight. For example, in the 
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case of the United States (US) National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk data 
collection system, parts of the programme were found to be illegal years after 
implementation – and only after being made public by a whistle-blower.50 
Worryingly, the use of surveillance technologies has gone beyond fighting 
terrorism, and they are increasingly being used for policing ordinary crimes in 
which extraordinary powers are unjustified.51 
Examples include the use of surveillance technology to track peaceful Black 
Lives Matter protesters in the US52 and the use of surveillance powers by 
local government in the UK to monitor trivial violations such as dog barking 
or illegal garbage dumping.53 This raises questions as to whether sufficient 
checks are in place to prevent the abuse of power, particularly with regard to 
judicial oversight54 and written policy stipulating fair practice.55 Both of these 




THEIR RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION
The fear of surveillance is stifling free speech, free 
thought and individuals’ ability to organise without fear 
of persecution
The expansion of surveillance powers has also created an industry of 
companies specialising in developing powerful surveillance tools and 
collecting data on individuals. This industry lacks oversight and is not 
accountable to the public.56 Such companies should equally be regulated to 
limit their use and develop democratic oversight. 
The efficacy of such mass data collection strategies to combat terrorism 
is also questionable, as those who use online platforms to organise 
terrorist attacks are likely to use encryption or other tools to mask their 
communications, meaning that the vast majority of surveillance data captured 
is not related to illegal activity. 
Calls for weakening encryption are equally unrealistic, as extremists will always 
be capable of developing their own encryption (as they have already done)57 
or use code words, while weakening encryption will only expose individuals 
to cybercriminals.58 A significant part of cybersecurity is in essence based on 
encryption, and undermining this foundation will only create new insecurities 
that threaten the basis of numerous industries dependent on being able to 
protect their information from nefarious actors. 
Further, the constant fear of surveillance can in itself lead to self-censorship.59 
Studies indicate that, following the Snowden revelations, Internet users have 
changed their online behaviour, with sudden declines in Wikipedia page 
views60 and Google searches61 on topics such as terrorism that users fear 
may rouse suspicion. Similarly, it has meant that individuals have become less 
likely to disclose political opinions62 or minority views63 online. This has even
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affected journalism, with studies showing that 
journalists are engaging in self-censorship over fears 
of surveillance.64
Considering that social media and the Internet have 
become some of the primary forms through which 
individuals obtain information and engage with political 
discussion, the effects of this type of self-censorship on 
democratic discourse are clear. Through discouraging 
minority views and political discussion online, as well as 
deterring citizens from learning more about controversial 
or difficult political questions, the fear of surveillance is 
stifling free speech, free thought and individuals’ ability 
to organise without fear of persecution. Without privacy, 
individuals cannot effectively exercise their right to 
freedom of expression.
Given that research on radicalisation indicates that being 
prevented from participating in politics is a significant 
driver of radicalisation,65 the suppression of free 
speech will likely lead to further radicalisation. Stifling 
dissent, rather than resolving issues peacefully through 
democratic dialogue, also likely increases the chances 
that the politically repressed may resort to violent tactics 
to make themselves heard.  
The importance of media in democracy
While the misuse of social media and the Internet by 
extremists makes it clear that there is a need for 
Internet governance, and that the online realm cannot 
be left to exist in a state of nature, freedom of expression 
must be maintained for a well-functioning democracy. 
For a democracy to function, an informed and 
knowledgeable electorate is vital, meaning that the 
information upon which voters base their decisions must 
be freely available.66 
For many, the media is their primary or only interaction 
with politics, and much of their political decisions, thinking 
and voting are based on the information obtained from 
media sources.67 From this, the public is able to hold 
elected officials accountable for their actions. Investigative 
journalism that reveals rights violations or the misdeeds of 
government plays a prominent role in accomplishing this. 
The media also serves to bring issues to the attention of 
policymakers and to represent the views of the public.68 
In this way, the media links citizens to the political process 
and allows their political views to be expressed within the 
bounds of the law. 
The traditional media can also play an important role in 
countering the narratives extremist groups build for their 
recruitment campaigns. Violent extremist groups often 
attempt to frame themselves as the defenders of the 
oppressed. By exposing their hypocrisy through accounts 
of their cruelty and their betrayal of the values that they 
claim to hold, the traditional media can undermine the 
false narratives built by these groups.69 A free media not 
only forms the foundation of a democratic society but can 
also serve to counter violent extremism. Free speech and 
the free flow of information promote understanding and 
create the opportunity for dialogue and through dialogue, 
provides a means for settling disagreements peacefully. 
A report by the European Broadcasting Union, for 
example, found that countries that have well-funded 
public service broadcasters and high levels of press 
freedom experience less public interest in right-wing 
extremism.70 Similarly, a study in Argentina in which 
12–13-year-old students were given newspapers to 
read and discuss in class once a week, showed that 
engagement with the media fostered more tolerant 
attitudes among students in line with democratic 
principles.71 Such a programme teaches students that 
it is acceptable to have different opinions, which makes 
them more tolerant of differing viewpoints and open to 
political discussion. Thus they are less susceptible to 
extremist views. 
A free media is vital for including citizens 
in the political process and resolving 
disputes peacefully
Both studies indicate that freedom of expression and an 
active media can counter extremist beliefs and create a 
more tolerant democratic society. 
This can, however, only be achieved if expression is 
truly free. As discussed above, fear of surveillance has 
led to self-censorship in the media and discouraged 
the public from seeking out information. Freedom of 
expression and privacy exist hand-in-hand. Undermining 
privacy erodes the freedom of expression upon which 
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democracy relies. For journalists and activists this is even more so, as 
the confidentiality of sources and their networks is vital to their ability to 
perform their democratic functions. Mass surveillance only suppresses open 
discussion – the opposite of the openness required of democratic societies. 
Conclusion
A strategy of limiting democratic freedoms with the aim of creating security 
is likely to be unsuccessful and will only lead to the further radicalisation of 
the repressed to violent extremist groups. Suppressing free discussion only 
allows discontent to continue unresolved and foment. A free media is vital for 
including citizens in the political process and resolving disputes peacefully, as 
it promotes discussion and has been shown to create mutual understanding 
and tolerance. Considering that social media and the Internet have become 
one of the primary forms through which individuals obtain information and 
engage with political discussion, these channels of communication must be 
kept open. 
GOVERNMENTS SHOULD 
ENCOURAGE MEDIA HOUSES 
TO ADOPT GOOD PRACTICES 
TO RESPONSIBLY REPORT 
TERRORIST INCIDENTS
While these tools may be exploited by extremists to promote their agenda, the 
underlying dynamics that make individuals susceptible to their messages exist 
independently of the Internet and social media. For efforts to counter violent 
extremism to be successful, policy must go beyond addressing channels of 
communication. Counter-terrorism responses that securitise communications 
through surveillance only suppress freedom of expression – one of the most 
important components of liberal democracy. 
For freedom of expression to exist, privacy must be maintained. Thus the 
expansion of surveillance powers must be contained within the bounds of a 
free democratic society. The potential for the abuse of these powers, and the 
infringement of the civil liberties that allow a democracy to function, has 
far-reaching consequences for the continuation of a democratic society built 
on accountability and free expression. Just as policies based purely on 
combatting violent extremism militarily will not succeed if the underlying 
drivers of radicalisation are not addressed, the suppression of free 
speech, which allows for concerns to be raised and resolved, will not defeat 
violent extremism. 
Recommendations
Develop international norms and rules to govern the Internet 
The international community should develop shared international principles, 
norms and rules to govern the Internet, in light of the transnational nature 
of communications technologies. Companies such as Facebook or Twitter, 
The expansion of surveillance powers must 
be contained within the bounds of a free 
democratic society
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which are positioned to regulate their own systems 
and have the technical knowledge to understand the 
complexity of these issues, should be included in the 
governance process. Democratic states should do this 
with human rights and free speech considerations at the 
core of their policies.
Increase democratic oversight and 
limit the use of surveillance 
States should introduce policies that increase oversight 
and limit the use, and misuse, of surveillance powers. 
These powers should particularly be limited in their 
application to ordinary policing. Intergovernmental 
organisations such as the Community of Democracies 
can play an important role in developing guidelines 
for addressing security considerations within a 
democratic framework. 
Regulate the export of surveillance tools 
States and the international community must develop 
regulations to control the export of surveillance tools, in 
line with arms control mechanisms. This should include 
oversight to monitor private companies that develop 
surveillance tools and collect data on individuals. 
Develop guidelines for responsible 
coverage of terrorist incidents
Governments should encourage media houses to 
adopt good practices to responsibly report terrorist 
incidents, to avoid perpetuating fear through unfounded 
speculation and sensational reporting. This should include 
entrenching norms on how terrorist incidents should 
be covered, and can be achieved through establishing 
shared journalistic standards on reporting terrorist 
incidents and ensuring that they are followed.
Build resilience in communities 
There is a need to foster resilience by strengthening 
the deliberative capacity of citizens to critically analyse 
information and reject extremist views, as regulators 
cannot realistically control or censor all communications. 
This means a focus on education and the development of 
an inclusive society. Suppressing dissent will not resolve 
the underlying drivers of violent extremism. 
14 WILL LIMITS ON FREE EXPRESSION PREVENT TERRORISM?
Notes
The author would like to thank Charlie Winter, from the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence, Simon Allison, from Mail & Guardian, 
and Eric Chinje, from the African Media Initiative, for 
assisting in the review of this report. 
1 JL Striegher, Violent-extremism: an examination of a definitional dilemma, 
Edith Cowan University, 2015, http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1046&context=asi
2 C Peoples and N Vaughan-Williams, Critical security studies: an 
introduction, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2015, 141.
3 R Borum, Radicalization into violent extremism: a review of social 
science theories, Journal of Strategic Security, 4:4, Winter 2011, http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss
4 T Bennett, Theories of the media, theories of society, in M Gurevitch et al. 
(eds), Culture, society and the media, London: Methuen, 1982.
5 AM Kaplan and M Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The challenges and 
opportunities of social media, Business Horizons, 53, 2010.
6 M Lister et al., New media: a critical introduction, 2nd ed., London: 
Routledge, 2009.
7 L Khatib, Image politics in the Middle East: the role of the visual in political 
struggle, London: I.B.Tauris, 2013.
8 J Mathiason, Internet governance: the new frontier of global institutions, 
London: Routledge, 2009.
9 RO Keohane and JS Nye, Power and interdependence in the information 
age, Foreign Affairs, 77:5, 1998.
10 A Madrigal, The inside story of how Facebook responded to Tunisian 
hacks, The Atlantic, 24 January 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-how-facebook-responded-
to-tunisian-hacks/70044/
11 PN Howard et al., Opening closed regimes: What was the role of social 
media during the Arab Spring?, Project on Information Technology & 
Political Islam, Working Paper 2011.1, 2011, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2595096
12 F el-Issawi, Tunisian media in transition, The Carnegie Papers, July 2012, 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/Polis/Files/Tunisian-Media.pdf
13 K Viner, How technology disrupted the truth, The Guardian, 12 July 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-
disrupted-the-truth
14 BL Nacos, Mass-mediated terrorism: mainstream and digital media in 
terrorism and counterterrorism, 3rd ed., Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
15 MM El-Bermawy, Your filter bubble is destroying democracy, Wired, 18 
November 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-bubble-destroying-
democracy/
16 J Burke, How the changing media is changing terrorism, The Guardian, 25 
February 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/how-
changing-media-changing-terrorism
17 P Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response, 2nd 
ed., London: Routledge, 2006.
18 J Burke, How the changing media is changing terrorism, The Guardian, 25 
February 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/how-
changing-media-changing-terrorism
19 C Winter, Media jihad: the Islamic State’s doctrine for information warfare, 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 
2017, 6, http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Media-jihad_web.pdf
20 P Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response, 
London: Frank Cass, 2001.
21 BL Nacos, Mass-mediated terrorism: the central role of the media in 
terrorism and counterterrorism, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
22 B McNair, An introduction to political communication, 5th ed., London: 
Routledge, 2011.
23 A Pattwell, T Mitman and D Porpora, Terrorism as failed political 
communication, International Journal of Communication, 9, 2015.
24 B McNair, An introduction to political communication, 5th ed., London: 
Routledge, 2011.
25 Ibid.
26 BF Walter, The strategy of ISIS: logic or lunacy?, Political Violence 
at a Glance, 16 November 2015, https://politicalviolenceataglance.
org/2015/11/16/the-strategy-of-isis-logic-or-lunacy/
27 J Burke, How the changing media is changing terrorism, The Guardian, 25 
February 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/how-
changing-media-changing-terrorism
28 AP Schmid and J de Graaf, Violence as communication: insurgent 
terrorism and the Western news media, London: Sage Publications, 1982.
29 K Borgeson and R Valeri, Conclusion, in K Borgeson and R Valeri (eds.), 
Terrorism in America, Boston: Jones and Bertlett Publishers, 2009.
30 AP Schmid and J de Graaf, Violence as communication: insurgent 
terrorism and the Western news media, London: Sage Publications, 1982.
31 E Bower, American deaths in terrorism vs. gun violence in one graph, CNN, 
3 October 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/03/us/terrorism-gun-
violence/
32 A Rizer and J Hartman, How the war on terror has militarized the police, 
The Atlantic, 7 November 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-has-militarized-the-police/248047/
33 DB Carter, Provocation and the strategy of terrorist and guerrilla attacks, 
Princeton University, Department of Politics, 23 February 2014, https://
www.princeton.edu/~dbcarter/David_B._Carter/Research_files/
strategicterror31.pdf
34 HJ Ingram, ‘That is what the terrorists want’: media as amplifier or 
disrupter of violent extremist propaganda, International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism, https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/INGRAM-paris-
speech.pdf
35 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Terrorism 
and the media: a handbook for journalists, 2017, http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0024/002470/247074E.pdf
36 C Beckett, Fanning the flames: reporting on terror in a networked world, 
Columbia Journalism Review, 22 September 2016, https://www.cjr.org/
tow_center_reports/coverage_terrorism_social_media.php
37 Y Veilleux-Lepage, Paradigmatic shifts in jihadism in cyberspace: the 
emerging role of unaffiliated sympathizers in the Islamic State’s social 
media strategy, Journal of Terrorism Research, 7:1, 2016.
38 JM Berger, Tailored online interventions: the Islamic State’s recruitment 
strategy, CTC Sentinel, 8:10, 2015, 19–22.
39 P Gill et al., Terrorist use of the Internet by the numbers, Criminology & 
Public Policy, 16:1, 2017, 114.
40 I von Behr et al., Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the Internet 
in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism, Rand Corporation, 2013, http://
AFRICA IN THE WORLD REPORT 2  |  SEPTEMBER 2017 15
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/
RAND_RR453.pdf
41 RC Cachalia, U Salifu and I Ndungu, Exploring the drivers of youth 
radicalisation in Africa, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Paper 296, 12 
September 2016, https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-dynamics-of-
youth-radicalisation-in-africa-reviewing-the-current-evidence
42 R MacKinnon, Joining Zone Nine, World Policy Journal, 31:3, 2014.
43 Committee to Protect Journalists, Egypt’s new anti-terror law deepens 
crackdown on press, 17 August 2015, https://cpj.org/2015/08/egypts-
new-anti-terrorism-law-deepens-crackdown-on.php
44 S Hershkovitz and R Tzezana, Connected devices give spies a powerful 
new way to surveil, Wired, 19 January 2017, https://www.wired.
com/2017/01/connected-devices-give-spies-powerful-new-way-surveil/
45 K Hinkson and S Marandola, La Presse columnist says he was put under 
police surveillance as part of ‘attempt to intimidate’, CBC/Radio Canada, 
31 October 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/journalist-patrick-
lagace-police-surveillance-spying-1.3828832
46 M Schwartz, Cyberwar for sale, The New York Times, 4 January 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/magazine/cyberwar-for-sale.html
47 K Surana, Spyware sold to Mexican government was used to target 




48 N Hopkins and J Morris, UK firm’s surveillance kit ‘used to crush Uganda 
opposition’, BBC News, 15 October 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
34529237
49 M Schwartz, Cyberwar for sale, The New York Times, 4 January 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/magazine/cyberwar-for-sale.html
50 C Savage and J Weisman, NSA collection of bulk call data is ruled illegal, 
The New York Times, 7 May 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/08/
us/nsa-phone-records-collection-ruled-illegal-by-appeals-court.html?_r=0
51 C Reilly, Forget terrorism: police want your data for the war on drugs, 
CNET, 10 October 2016, https://www.cnet.com/au/news/police-
telecommunications-data-metadata-warrants-drug-crime-terrorism/
52 B Norton, FBI, Homeland Security sued for records on surveillance of 
Black Lives Matter activists, Salon, 21 October 2016, http://www.salon.
com/2016/10/20/fbi-homeland-security-sued-for-records-on-surveillance-
of-black-lives-matter-activists/
53 A Asthana, Revealed: British councils used Ripa to secretly spy on public, 
The Guardian, 25 December 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/dec/25/british-councils-used-investigatory-powers-ripa-to-
secretly-spy-on-public
54 G Greenwald, Rand Paul is right: NSA routinely monitors Americans’ 
communications without warrants, The Intercept, 13 March 2017, https://
theintercept.com/2017/03/13/rand-paul-is-right-nsa-routinely-monitors-
americans-communications-without-warrants/
55 New York Civil Liberties Union, NYPD has used stingrays more than 1 000 
times since 2008, 11 February 2016, https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-
releases/nypd-has-used-stingrays-more-1000-times-2008
56 S Biddle, How Peter Thiel’s Palantir helped the NSA spy on the 
whole world, the Intercept, 22 February 2017, https://theintercept.
com/2017/02/22/how-peter-thiels-palantir-helped-the-nsa-spy-on-the-
whole-world/
57 J Vijayan, Update improves encryption tool for al-Qaeda backers, PC 
World, 4 February 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/article/142149/article.
html
58 The Guardian, The Guardian view on counter-terrorism: strong encryption 
makes us all safer, 27 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/mar/27/the-guardian-view-on-counter-terrorism-
strong-encryption-makes-us-all-safer
59 T McMullan, What does the panopticon mean in the age of digital 
surveillance?, The Guardian, 23 July 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jul/23/panopticon-digital-surveillance-jeremy-bentham
60 J Penney, Chilling effects: online surveillance and Wikipedia use, Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 31:1, 2016.
61 A Mathews and CE Tucker, Government surveillance and Internet search 
behavior, Social Science Research Network, 29 April 2015, https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2412564
62 E Stoycheff, Under surveillance: examining Facebook’s spiral of silence 
effects in the wake of NSA Internet monitoring, Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly, 93:2, 2016.
63 K Hampton et al., Social media and the ‘spiral of silence’, Pew Research 
Center, 26 August 2014, http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/26/social-
media-and-the-spiral-of-silence/
64 FDR Group and PEN American Center, Chilling effects: NSA surveillance 
drives US writers to self-censor, https://pen.org/sites/default/files/
Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf.
65 RC Cachalia, U Salifu and I Ndungu, Exploring the drivers of youth 
radicalisation in Africa, ISS, Paper 296, 12 September 2016, https://
issafrica.org/research/papers/the-dynamics-of-youth-radicalisation-in-
africa-reviewing-the-current-evidence
66 B McNair, An introduction to political communication, 5th ed., London: 
Routledge, 2011.
67 ME McCombs and DL Shaw, The agenda-setting function of mass media, 
The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36:2, 1972.
68 P Robinson, The role of the media and public opinion, in S Smith, A 
Hadfield and T Dunne (eds), Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases, 2nd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
69 P Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response, 2nd 
ed., London: Routledge, 2006.
70 European Broadcasting Union, PSM correlations: links between public 
service media and societal well-being, June 2016, https://www.ebu.
ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-MIS%20-%20PSM%20
Correlations%20-%20Public.pdf
71 R Morduchowicz et al., Teaching political information and democratic 
values in a new democracy: an Argentine experiment, Comparative 
Politics, 28, 1996.
About the project  
This report is part of a series of papers on democracy, security, and violent extremism prepared 
for the Community of Democracies’ Democracy and Security Dialogue. The project seeks to foster 
greater collaboration among democratic governments, donors, civil society and academics to 
improve security outcomes and create a more conducive environment for the strengthening of 
democracy around the world. For more on the project and related materials, including the final 
report, visit www.brookings.edu/democracy-security-dialogue
© 2017, Institute for Security Studies
Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies and the author, and no 
part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the author 
and the publishers.
The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory 
Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.
Cover image: Amelia Broodryk/ISS
About ISS Africa in the World Reports 
Africa in the World Reports consider the implications and lessons from Africa for global policy. The ISS 
works on complex threats that have transnational and global impact, and require innovative solutions 
at the international and local level. These reports cover topics like terrorism, organised crime, the 
impact of migration, and long-term futures analysis of conflict, development and governance in Africa.
About the ISS
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) partners to build knowledge and skills that secure Africa’s future. 
Our goal is to enhance human security as a means to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity. The 
ISS is an African non-profit organisation with offices in South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal. 
Our work covers transnational crimes, migration, peacekeeping, crime prevention and criminal justice, 
peacebuilding, and the analysis of conflict and governance. 
The ISS uses its networks and influence to provide timely and credible analysis, practical training 
and technical assistance to governments and civil society. This promotes better policy and practice, 
because senior officials can make informed decisions about how to deal with Africa’s human 
security challenges. 
Acknowledgements
This report was made possible with the support of the Government of Norway. The ISS is also grateful 
for support from the other members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation and 
the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and 
the USA.
About the author
Albertus Schoeman is a consultant in the Transnational Threats and International Crime Programme of 
the ISS.
